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ABSTRACT
Between 1800 and 1820, Buenos Aires and the former colonial
Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata faced an unprecedented fiscal crisis caused
by the revolutionary wars, eventually solved by levying forced loans. This
paper considers the unintended institutional consequences of these
loans. The novel devices allowed (1) the holders of forced-loan coupons
to use these bonds to pay off debts incurred in customs duties and (2)
the holders of bills of exchange involved in the provisioning of the military
to use these bills to pay part of their forced loans. Starting with the concep-
tualisation of the institutional order as a complex system, this paper exam-
ines the interactions among the circulation of financial paper bills, the
financing of war and changes in the position of the merchants’ guild and
the legal framework for Atlantic trade. It thereby contributes to renewing
institutional change approaches in the Spanish-American context.
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RESUMEN
Los empréstitos forzosos constituyen una de las principales respuestas
a las dificultades y crisis fiscales que se suceden en Buenos Aires a partir de
1806. Este artículo analiza las consecuencias institucionales no intencio-
nales de estos préstamos. A partir de 1813, los nuevos mecanismos permi-
tieron: (1) a los titulares de pagarés de los empréstitos cancelar deudas en
derechos de aduana y (2) a los titulares de letras de cambio implicados en
el aprovisionamiento militar, utilizar estas letras para pagar parte de sus
préstamos forzosos. Partiendo de la conceptualización del orden institu-
cional como un sistema complejo, el presente artículo examina las interac-
ciones entre, por un lado, la circulación de papel y el financiamiento de la
guerra y, por el otro, las transformaciones en el marco legal del comercio
atlántico y el papel del Consulado. Contribuye así renovar los enfoques del
cambio institucional en el contexto hispanoamericano.
Palabras clave: guerra y finanzas, préstamos forzosos, comercio
atlántico, Buenos Aires, Historia económica
1. INTRODUCTION
By the end of the 18th century, Buenos Aires had become the thriving
commercial centre of the Spanish Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, an entity
that roughly covered the modern-day territories of Argentina, Bolivia,
Paraguay and Uruguay. Despite the economic growth of the Plata region
during the second half of the century, the city was dependent for its mili-
tary and administrative expenses on the regular supply of funds from the
treasuries of Upper Peru, mainly those of the Potosí mining area. These
internal colonial subsidies, known as situados, formed the cement that
held much of the Spanish Empire together; fiscal surpluses from revenue-
rich areas financed the areas encumbered by administrative and military
burdens, enabling Spain to retain her foothold in the Americas.
Around the turn of the century, however, the situado revenues started to
decline and eventually disappeared altogether (Halperín Donghi 1982;
Amaral 1993, 2011). At the same time, the coming of the French
Revolutionary Wars and the occupation of Spain by Napoleonic armies
led to political instability in the La Plata region, accompanied by the
need to mobilise resources for war. The occupation of Buenos Aires by
British troops in 1806 and 1807 sparked a process that gave birth, after
the revolution of 1810, to a de facto independent republican order, with
major financial consequences. In 1813, the local authorities of Buenos
Aires resorted to the expedient of forced loans, because taxes and other
contributions had proved insufficient to pay for increasing war costs.
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The promissory notes (pagarés) issued against these loans—as well as the
use of bills of exchange to finance military expenses—resulted in an unpre-
cedented form of paper circulation in the region. The central objective of
this essay is to analyse the mechanisms at work in such exchanges and
to show how they contributed to institutional and economic change.
In a pioneering and still authoritative study, Amaral analysed the char-
acteristics of forced loans and the use of pagarés as a substitute for coin
when paying tax debts (Amaral 1981, pp. 40-49). Moutoukias recently
added analyses of the circulation of these public promissory notes
among individuals. This important issue, which researchers have tended
to overlook until now (Moutoukias 2015, 2018), will form the focus of
the current study. We present a range of new evidence in order to examine
the interactions among the circulation of financial paper, the financing of
war and institutional change. We look at the local dismantling of the colo-
nial legal framework for Atlantic trade that limited or prohibited direct
commerce with foreign powers, as well as the weakening of the merchants’
guild, which had controlled that trade and played a key role in the local
political order of the ancien régime.
The problem of institutional transformation in revolutionary Latin
America has been conceptualised by Irigoin and Grafe in terms of political
fragmentation. They argue that the crisis of legitimacy of the Spanish mon-
archy and thus the collapse of the arbitrating power caused by the
Napoleonic occupation of 1808, turned «fiscal interdependence between
regions into beggar-thy-neighbour strategies and internecine conflict»,
and that this, in turn, led to territorial fragmentation (Irigoin and Grafe
2009). Territorial fragmentation is not similar to institutional change in
every respect, however, and this aspect was not dominant in all cases; it
did not affect New Spain, for instance. In fact, in the Rio de la Plata, com-
petition for fiscal resources was not the cause but the consequence of the
segmentation of territories based on a plurality of jurisdictional and polit-
ical scopes (Morelli 2005; Ternavasio 2007; Dedieu 2010). The particular
relevance of the Buenos Aires case lies in the fact that the local mobilisa-
tion of resources for war produced major institutional innovations, which
were by no means just the political effect of the Napoleonic occupation of
Spain in 1808 and the ensuing crisis of the Spanish monarchy.
In contrast to Irigoin and Grafe’s argument, the Spanish imperial polit-
ical order in America could be conceptualised in terms of independent but
articulated institutional spheres; the main ones being, on the one hand, the
political community of the city and, on the other hand, the organisations
and mechanisms of the financial, military and political power of the
Crown, including the situado financial transfers. In fact, recent literature
presents these institutional layers as a central feature of the customary
constitution of the Kingdom of Castile (Herzog 2003; Dedieu 2010). This
paper conceptualises the institutional configuration as a complex system
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in which each component followed its own non-linear dynamics, but
where all components had shifting reciprocal connections and affected
each other more or less randomly (Morin 1977). To some degree, the
notion of the political order as an unintended or emergent combination
of taxis and cosmos is useful here; an order where the success or
failure of institutional solutions is not the result of specific actors’ designs,
but of unexpected outcomes of games played in several arenas
(Hayek 1973). Castoriadis’ theoretical contribution fits the idea of a
non-teleological sequence of historical development as the intersection
of manifold temporalities and causalities (Castoriadis 1975, pp. 63-82).
We will thus address the institutional effects of paper circulation in
Buenos Aires as part of this framework, by taking a micro-level approach,
considering the issue from the perspective of political and social actors,
and looking at how they responded to economic and military challenges
and how their actions reshaped the political economy, creating new condi-
tions that invited new responses.
2. THE FABRIC OF THE FISCAL CRISIS: ATLANTIC TRADE, URBAN
INSTITUTIONS, MILITARY SPENDING AND THE SITUADO
Rio de la Plata’s economy was based on a huge land supply, limited
technological change, but increasing productivity thanks to the growing
population. Migration and natural growth pushed up the population of
Buenos Aires from almost 38,000 inhabitants in 1778 to no fewer than
77,000 in 1810 (Johnson 1979, pp. 114-116; 2011, pp. 28-31)1. External
trade entailed the exchange of silver from Upper Peru for European manu-
facturing goods and slaves, also generating growing exports of local sta-
ples. In the later 18th century, this exchange corresponded to an annual
average of precious metals exports ranging from 3 to 4 million pesos
(or piasters). Moutoukias has calculated that precious metals accounted
for between 80 and 90 per cent of the value of exports between 1760
and 1796. Recent estimates show that the export of hides was becoming
increasingly important around the turn of the century. The export of pre-
cious metals—stored in the port, thanks to the complex transactions that
linked the Rio de la Plata to its hinterland, including the mining econ-
omies—created the conditions for the sale of this local staple to Atlantic
markets. In turn, this had a huge impact on the regional economy; the
1 Lyman Jonson’s comprehensive studies draw on data from baptism records and incomplete
censuses to provide total population estimates based on crude birth rates. The actual population
may have been slightly higher or lower. Nonetheless, his figures—higher than those in previous
studies—are robust and consistent with contemporary accounts. We thank him for his willingness
to discuss his approach with us.
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value of the exported hides exceeded the total value of all other agricultural
production (Moutoukias 1995, 2000; cf. Brown 1979; Rosal and Schmit
1999; Moraes 2012; Miguez 2018).
In the final decades of the 18th century, the Atlantic trade of the Rio de
la Plata region consisted of different flows: navigation to other Spanish
possessions; intercolonial traffic with Brazil and the African coast, which
extended to Mozambique and Asian trade in the late 1780s; trade with
Europe, via Spanish ports or illegal trade with foreign powers; and, after
the mid-1790s, trade with the United States (Cuenca Esteban 1984b;
Cooney 1986; Borucki 2011; Prado 2015, 2017). The legal framework of
this commercial activity was complex and smuggling was common. In
1777, 1 year after the creation of the Viceroyalty, Buenos Aires benefited
from the commercial regime that had existed in Cuba since 1765.
Limited to subjects of the Crown, this regime had created «free and pro-
tected trade between European and American Spaniards», designed as
«national» trade on both sides of the Atlantic. This obviously prohibited
foreigners from trading directly in American ports, while goods of foreign
origin, re-exported from Spain to Spanish America, were overtaxed. The
reform of the old monopoly of Cadiz—one of the main pillars of Charles
III’s economic reforms—therefore expanded and enhanced the mercantil-
ist principle of exclusive colonial trade forbidden to foreign powers (Stein
and Stein 2009)2. A series of privileges and specific authorisations was
added to the general framework created in 1777 to produce an often-
contradictory legal construction, which nevertheless preserved this prin-
ciple. From the 1790s, these privileges and exemptions affected trade
with foreign colonies, the slave trade and the temporary permission
given to neutral foreign powers—including the Portuguese colonies—to
trade in certain parts of Spanish America, when the war with England
blocked the Spanish ports (de Studer 1958; Cooney 1989)3. Meanwhile,
smuggling, which had apparently been contained in the early 1780s,
took off again at the end of this decade, with Luso-Brazilians, North
Americans and the English being the main players (Cuenca Esteban
1984b; Moutoukias 2000; Prado 2015).
One central dimension of the colonial trading system was the collective
embeddedness of the group of great merchants in the political order of the
city, as well as local structures of royal sovereignty. This institutional grid
provided the framework for a range of strategies—including the defence of
2 Reglamento y aranceles reales para el comercio libre de España a Indias de 12. de octubre de
1778, Madrid, Imprenta de Pedro Marin [1778]; Tableau de l’Espagne moderne par Jean François
Baron de Bourgoing, Paris, chez l’auteur, Du Pont, Devaux, Regnault [1797], Vol. 1.
3 Documentos para la historia argentina, t. VII, Comercio de Indias. Consulado, comercio de neg-
ros y de extranjeros [henceforth DHA-7], Buenos Aires, Compañía Sudamericana de billetes de banco,
1915.
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restrictive trade regulations, smuggling, service or contributions to the
Crown and the negotiation of new exemptions, often adopted by
the same individuals—whilst ensuring this community of rent-seekers’
control over long-distance trade. At the beginning of the 19th century,
this process—in which local traders were as active as the Crown—had
already been under way for two centuries and these traders had formed
a corporation, which collectively enjoyed the privileges negotiated with
the Crown. Soon after the city was founded in the late 16th century,
Buenos Aires saw the arrival of new settlers. They rapidly became an
elite controlling diverse activities, such as the illegal export of silver, the
import of slaves, access to land and overseas trade; mostly smuggling,
but sometimes benefiting from royal dispensations. This elite also seized
control of the organ of municipal administration and local justice, the
Cabildo (Gelman 1984, 1985; Moutoukias 2000). It then emerged as a de
facto corporation, the cuerpo del comercio. By the mid-18th century, cor-
porate control of commercial justice had become the subject of a major
conflict among the local governor, the Viceroy of Peru and a merchant fac-
tion (Moutoukias 2017). Later, in 1779, the formerly irregular merchants’
councils ( juntas) developed into a permanent form of representation, and
the powerful traders eventually obtained a formal merchants’ guild with its
own court in 1796: the Consulado (Kraselsky 2011). As Adelman has
argued, this completed the configuration of the «political property» of
the major merchants in the maritime trade of Buenos Aires (Adelman
1999, pp. 29-30).
The Consulado and the city council (Cabildo) thus became the two
major corporations that underpinned the political order of the city. Both
collected specific duties related to the cost of their respective political
and judicial functions and were consequently able to finance political sup-
port for the monarchy and its local agents in exchange for new privileges.
This support usually took the form of financial assistance in difficult times,
for which corporations also mobilised contributions from notable sub-
jects. In a political world of plural hierarchies and fragmented sovereignty,
such donations were demanded as part of «service» to the king; as such,
they were the counterpoint of «grace, merit and reward» (Dedieu 2010,
Ch. 1; see also Fernández Albaladejo 1992; Grieco 2014).
Despite the commercial growth of the region, the fiscal revenues gener-
ated by local economic activity and Atlantic colonial trade failed to provide
sufficient resources for running the local administrative and military
machinery. Between 1791 and 1805, Potosí’s Royal Treasury subsidies
funded more than 70 per cent of local military and administrative spending
(Halperín Donghi 1982, Chs. 1 and 2). The situado transfers for Buenos
Aires became regular from the 1670s onwards, when Buenos Aires
assumed a more pronounced military role. At the time of the Seven
Years’ War, Governor Cevallos obtained a considerable increase in the
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situado. Between 1760 and 1764, the Buenos Aires treasury received
almost 1 million pesos from the situado. This amount increased to 8.3
million pesos in 1776-1780, with the establishment of the Viceroyalty of
Rio de la Plata4.
From the early 17th century onwards, silver transfers had given rise to a
dense pattern of transactions along the roads between Potosí and Buenos
Aires. The garrison officers responsible for the conveyance of the situado
advanced coins or silver bars for commercial operations along the roads;
traders provided subsistence to soldiers and used their return from the
situado in foreign trade; and royal financial officers used the situado
funds for their own personal investments. Clearing mechanisms arose
between traders and treasuries, embedding the royal finances firmly in
local trade. This resulted in a dense network that connected numerous
large and small merchants to the military and to political and financial offi-
cials (Moutoukias 1988, 1992; Saguier 1989; Grafe and Irigoin 2012,
pp. 170-176; Wasserman 2016).
The Potosí transfers are merely one of many examples of the massive
revenue distributions within the Spanish Empire that served to finance
both the defence in America and the war efforts in Europe. Irigoin and
Grafe’s authoritative «negotiated absolutism» model emphasises the bar-
gaining processes between the sovereign power and local political commu-
nities. As part of the Crown’s efforts to integrate the military finances
within a rebalancing of resources between the imperial territories, the
increases and decreases in the situado should be understood as a result
of such negotiations (Grafe and Irigoin 2006; Marichal 2007, 2008;
Irigoin and Grafe 2008, 2012; Marichal and Von Grafenstein 2012).
The numerous fluctuations in the size of the situados were indeed
dependent upon the negotiations that took place within the political net-
works that linked the authorities and colonial elites. However, the decline
of the Potosí transfers to Buenos Aires at the beginning of the 19th century
seems to have emanated from a more complex combination of factors. The
total amount of tax revenue received by the Buenos Aires treasury via the
situado reached 13,603 million pesos between 1792 and 1801. In the fol-
lowing decade, at 6,612 million pesos, this figure was more than halved,
1803 and 1806 being the years with the lowest inflows (see Figure 1).
Expressed as percentages, this meant that for the first period the situado
subsidies represented between 75 and 81 per cent of the fiscal revenues
of Buenos Aires; whereas from 1802 to 1811, they shrank to roughly
one-third of this amount, before coming to a complete halt in 1810-1811
as a consequence of the political and military developments that resulted
4 Archivo General de Indias [henceforth AGI], Buenos Aires, Correspondencia con los
Gobernadores, legajos 43 and 46; Expedientes de Real Hacienda, legajos 473 and 475.
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in the loss of control over Upper Peru (Halperín Donghi 1982, Chs. 1 and 2;
Amaral 2011, Appendix II). One critical factor in this evolution was the
effort required from other treasuries to ensure that the situado was sent
to Buenos Aires. Grafe and Irigoin underline the fact that Potosí both
sent subsidies to other regions and received transfers from other Upper
Peru treasuries (Grafe and Irigoin 2006, p. 266). To estimate the burden
that the Buenos Aires situado placed on the available fiscal resources, we
need to consider Amaral’s figures for Buenos Aires and Klein’s figures
for the whole of Upper Peru. This burden was enormous. Between 1790
and 1809, an average amount of 911,275 pesos was sent to Buenos Aires
each year; that is, 28 per cent of the 3.3 million-peso annual average tax
revenue for all the nine treasuries of Upper Peru combined (Klein 1994,
pp. 67-78; Amaral 2011, Annex 2).
These revenues included mining production taxes (16 per cent), the
tribute from the Indians (a head tax, 24 per cent) and revenues from an
array of other minor taxes on trade and monopolies. In these decades,
the total tax revenue of Upper Peru continued to rise despite the decline
in silver production. Figures published by TePaske and Brown show a
gradual decrease in the output of silver, with a marked drop during the
years 1801-1805. Klein has demonstrated how this development reduced
the revenues from taxes on mining production and trade as part of the
total tax revenue of Upper Peru. At the same time, the Indian contribution
continued to rise (Klein 1994, pp. 71-72, 77; TePaske and Brown 2010,
FIGURE 1
INCOME AND EXPENDITURE OF THE TREASURY OF BUENOS AIRES,
1789-1821 × 1,000 PESOS.
Sources: Amaral (1988, 1995, 2011). See also the Appendix.
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pp. 152-154, 186-193, 246), a paradox considered by Tandeter in his fine
analysis of the crisis of 1800-1805. He looks at the chain of droughts, fam-
ines, epidemics and increased mortality that followed one another in par-
allel with the increase in fiscal income from the tributes. In the first years
of the 19th century, the incomes of the treasuries in Upper Peru continued
to rise, mainly because of the growing contribution of the Indian commu-
nities in a context of deep crisis. This brought numerous conflicts and
social tensions to the major cities of Upper Peru (Tandeter 1991,
pp. 66-69). It can be assumed that this led to a redefinition of priorities
in short-term negotiations about shipments to other offices, including
Buenos Aires, before the loss of control over Bolivia resulted in the defini-
tive halt of the situado in 1811.
Between 1792 and 1801, in order to cover current civil and military
spending, Buenos Aires needed total revenues of between 16.7 and 18
million pesos, most of which came from the situado subsidies and just
2.3 million from taxes on trade. Occasional imbalances, such as that in
1794, were compensated for with transfers between the different accounts
of the royal treasury. These transfers entailed the temporary use of the
funds, over which the royal officers had custody but not the right to
spend freely, anticipating the future arrival of the situado. This was by
far the most important mechanism for offsetting imbalances in local
accounts. Between 1797 and 1802, there were also loans and donations
from corporations and individuals, but they were transferred to Spain,
and amounted to no more than 20 per cent of the transfers between
accounts in the same period (Amaral 2011, 2018; Grieco 2014; see also
the Appendix).
Nevertheless, this means that the financial system was already weak
prior to the increasing military mobilisations after 1806 and the rise of
political tensions and conflicts. With the crisis and collapse of the
Spanish monarchy, war financing was to play a fundamental role in insti-
tutional and economic changes in the Río de la Plata region, starting
immediately with the mobilisation of the urban militia during the
English invasions of 1806-1807. The creation of new military units
between 1807 and 1809—rather politicised militias, which also intervened
in internal conflicts—cost 2.8 million pesos in those years, compared with
the 1.7 million pesos of the annual budget 5 years previously. This rising
trend was maintained by the further professionalisation of the troops
and the creation of new armies. According to estimates by Halperín
Donghi, military expenditure increased sharply between 1806 and 1815;
it totalled 4.6 million pesos between 1801 and 1805, rising by 70 per
cent to 7.9 million for the years 1806-1810, and reaching 8 million in
1811-1815. Considering the local net expenditure of Buenos Aires—that
is, without the transfers to Spain and other treasuries and frontier areas—
military expenditure accounted for 53 per cent in 1801-1805, 73 per cent
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in 1806-1810 and 67 per cent in 1811-1815. Henceforth, war finances were
the main priority for the Buenos Aires authorities (Halperín 1982, pp. 77-85,
135, 142-175, 210-259).
Such increases were in line with the similar processes of militarisation
in other parts of the former Spanish Empire (Thibaud 2003; Sánchez
Santiro 2016, pp. 136, 150). Recent research shows that militarisation
played a central role, bringing new dynamics of political participation,
the rallying of popular support and the rise of new principles of legitimacy
for the Rio de la Plata (Gonzalez Bernaldo 1990; Adelman 2010; Bragoni
and Mata de Lopez 2010). Ravinovich has emphasised the surprising abil-
ity of the belligerent sovereign powers to maintain a high degree of military
mobilisation, estimating rates of male participation in the army that were
even higher than in revolutionary France (Ravinovich 2012, p. 41).
The year 1806 marked the beginning of a 10-year period of financial
difficulties, military contingencies and political instability. The expansion
of military spending plunged the fragile Buenos Aires treasury into
fiscal crisis. Figure 1 summarises the situation between 1789 and 1821.
The revenues included the situado and contributions from urban
corporations and individuals, as well as the forced loans after 1813.
Expenditure comprised transfers to other accounts and reimbursements
of the contributions (see the Appendix). Figure 1 also shows the share in
income from the situado and customs, although other revenues are not
specified (see Figure 2).
Until the beginning of the 19th century, the tax system seems to have
responded well to the financial needs of the capital of the Viceroyalty of
the Rio de la Plata. As we saw above, the system was based on the redistri-
bution of fiscal surpluses from Upper Peru that imposed a heavy burden on
the royal treasuries in these regions. From 1802 onwards, with the situado
decreasing, this tax system fell under increasing strain and the transfers
between different accounts were no longer sufficient to overcome the
imbalances. The fact that there was a decline in silver shipments to
Spain and others treasuries near Buenos Aires provided some relief.
Meanwhile, revenues from customs fell sharply in 1806, because of the
British attacks and the disruption of trade at sea (O’Rourke 2006). It was
not until 1808-1809 that revenue levels were back at the 1803-1804 levels,
yet expenditure continued to rise. With the start of militarisation in
1806-1807, a fiscal crisis was imminent; spending would exceed revenues
by an annual average of 10 per cent until 1814.
Between 1806 and 1812, the local authorities resorted to the traditional
repertoire of emergency finances: negotiating donations, contributions
and loans from the Cabildo, the Consulado and individuals within the insti-
tutional universe depicted above. In Figure 2, «urban institutions» reflect
the substantial input of both urban corporations, which exceeded customs
revenue until 1809. Having started in 1806, donations and contributions
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from individuals—mostly forced, but some voluntary—were increasingly
required after 1810. These contributions were still conceived as part of
the traditional duty of personal service to the sovereign in times of emer-
gency and did not include any specific capital repayment clause. Until very
recently, some contributors could expect an institutional reward or rent for
their contribution and, in the case of Cabildo and Consulado loans, the
debt was recognised although rarely fully repaid (Amaral 2011, 2018,
Grieco 2014). During the period between 1806 and 1812, the contributions
made by the Cabildo and the Consulado from their own funds represented
79 per cent of the total input from «urban institutions», the rest
being donations from individuals made through these institutions and
transfers from other accounts (the Monopoly of Tobacco, church levies
(claveria de diezmo), and so forth (see the Appendix for sources and further
details).
Spurred on by the fiscal crisis, in 1809 the authorities suspended the
above-mentioned restrictions on foreign commerce, authorising foreign
traders to operate in Buenos Aires. The opening of the Atlantic trade—
partially at first, and gradually more extensively—resulted in substantially
higher customs revenues (see also Figure 1). For another 2 to 3 years,
«urban institutions» and wealthy individuals helped to counterbalance
the deficit created by military spending but, in parallel with the gradual
building of the new republican order, their input dwindled and eventually
disappeared. The public finances inherited from the Old Colonial Regime
thus reached, and even overran, their limit and subsequent revolutionary
regimes were confronted with the need to find new mechanisms.
FIGURE 2
CONTRIBUTION OF URBAN INSTITUTIONS, FORCED LOANS AND DEFICIT,
1806-1821 (×000 PESOS).
Sources: Amaral (1988, 1995, 2011). See also the Appendix.
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3. POLITICAL VOLATILITY AND FINANCIAL INNOVATION: FORCED
LOANS
The new political context, the higher degree of militarisation and the
unprecedented fiscal crisis created room for innovation. From the moment
that British troops attacked Buenos Aires, political instability became a
central element of the city’s institutional life (Halperin Donghi 1971b).
Sobremonte, the viceroy who had been appointed in 1804, fled the city
when the British occupied Buenos Aires. After a second attempt at military
occupation by the British, the urban institutions thereupon named Liniers,
a Navy officer, as the new viceroy; he was confirmed in office by the
Spanish Crown in 1807. This reflects the extreme political volatility and,
at the same time, the role of the Consulado and the Cabildo in the local pol-
itical order of the monarchy. Liniers was one of the two military leaders to
emerge from these events, alongside his rival Alzaga, the previous prior
(head and judge) of the merchant guild and mayor of the city council
(Amaral and Moutoukias 2012). The former was subsequently replaced
by Viceroy Cisneros in 1809, put in place by the Spanish Junta Central
that had resisted the Napoleonic occupation. Cisneros, in turn, was
deposed during the May Revolution of 1810 in Buenos Aires. A de facto
republican period followed, characterised by new forms of political com-
petition and instability, with local sovereign governments operating in
the emergent republican structure. In 1816, the United Provinces of
South America declared independence from Spain, and between 1814
and 1820 the two successive Constituent Assemblies appointed
«Supreme Directors» to govern the United Provinces of the Rio de la
Plata (Halperin Donghi 1971b, Ternavasio 2007).
These successive unstable governments had to ensure the transfer of
funds for armies intervening in different theatres. To raise funds, until
1812, they resorted to the «traditional» financial mechanisms mentioned
above. In July 1813, however, the first Constituent Assembly «… ordained
that the capitalists of all categories furnish a loan of 500 thousand
pesos …» and decided on new conditions regarding forced loans5.
Between 1813 and 1821, sixteen loans were demanded for a total amount
of 4 million pesos, of which more than 2.5 million was actually raised.
Table 1 shows the amounts demanded and sums actually received by the
government. In order to produce these data, we compared the figures
obtained by Moutoukias from the balance sheets of the actual forced
loans between 1820 and 1821 and the data registered in the Buenos
Aires treasury, as published by Amaral (see the Appendix).
5 Registro Oficial de la República Argentina [henceforth RORA], Buenos Aires, Publicación
Oficial 1879, Tomo primero, no. 518.
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In return for the loans, individuals received promissory notes (pagarés)
from the authorities. Table 1 also lists the pagarés that were still extant in
1821, according to the year contracted. The mechanisms of these notes
varied with the fortunes of war and political stability, but had the following
central features:
• they were negotiable by endorsement.
• They could be used to pay all or part, usually half, of the debts that
the holder (or the beneficiary of an endorsement) had accumulated
at the Customs Office, caused by unpaid customs duties.
• After a minimum period that varied in accordance with military for-
tunes, usually 6 months to a year, the Customs Office could also
redeem government bonds drawing up bills of exchange, being the
drawees debtors of the same Customs.
• They received an interest rate of 3.8 or 12 per cent—occasionally
even 15 per cent—according to the terms of redemption and mili-
tary circumstances (Amaral 1981; Moutoukias 2018).
The government pagarés were thus exclusively redeemed by using them as
a means of payment of the holder’s tax debts at the Customs Office. Even if
the repayment of paper by the Buenos Aires treasury was anticipated in the
TABLE 1










1813 1,100 425.1 425.1 4.41
1814 128.5 208.5
1815 550 292.8 392.8 1.90
1816 380 266.5 486.5 3.78
1817 40.6 40.6
1818 1,000 654.1 654.9 79.02
1819 850 565.1 519.1 168.12
1820 50 68.3 29.3 2.30
1821 150 167.3 167.3 72.94
Total 4,080 2,608.3 2,924.1 332.46
Sources: AGN, Sala X, legajos 2-9-7, 9-4-2, 9-4-3, 11-1-1, 11-5-1 and 22-2-7; RORA 1879. For Amaral
data, see the Appendix.
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terms and conditions of forced loans, the delay was never defined but con-
ditioned to the evolution of war. If the loanholder (the original owner or
the beneficiary of an endorsement) immediately introduced the loan to
pay customs duties, the title was accepted without a premium. However,
if the loanholder waited for the minimum period stipulated in the loan,
usually 3 months, the title benefited from 3 per cent interest. This could
increase as long as the owner kept his title or promissory note before sub-
mission to the Customs Office. Between 1814 and 1816, the years of great-
est political and military tension, the regulations changed temporarily, and
the end-term of presentation to the Customs Office was fixed at «six
months after the end of the war», or made subject to future, still unspeci-
fied, decrees. Not all forced loans entailed promissory notes that could be
transferred by endorsement. Yet, such exceptional regulations did not
modify the conditions of previous loans, nor did they create a precedent
for later ones (Amaral 1981, pp. 42-44)6.
The result was a complex and confusing patchwork of debts that were
increasingly negotiated and circulated among individuals. The government
tried to consolidate its debt in 1817, making the circulation of paper even
more widespread. A decree issued by the Supreme Director Pueyrredón in
March stipulated that all debts against the state—«all claims that weigh on
the state», whatever their origin—could be replaced by a new promissory
note. Again, this was negotiable by endorsement and the state accepted
it as an equivalent to coins, but new titles could now be used to pay only
half of the taxes on maritime and land trade that holders owed to the
Customs Office. The rest was to be paid in coins. Thus, while redeeming
a portion of the old debt, this consolidation encouraged the entry of
coins into the treasury. Detailed official estimates show that the measure
succeeded in reducing the confusion. By the end of 1817, the state treasur-
ies had covered all of the notes presented, whereas the available income
from customs covered the titles that were still in circulation7.
To what degree were these loans «forced» or «voluntary»? History
shows that few countries have been able to raise loans freely on the finan-
cial market, either because the market lacked reliable intermediaries or
because financiers did not trust the government’s fiscal management.
Even highly advanced economies, such as those of Venice and Florence,
relied on forced loans for centuries (’t Hart, Brandon and Torres
Sánchez 2018). The contrast is not simply one of «forced» vs. «voluntary»,
however; in times of crisis, even «voluntary loans» were of a forced nature,
since rich officers might feel obliged to grant funds to the government (Van
der Heijden 2006). The sociology of organisations also shows how
6 RORA, nos. 518 and 599.
7 RORA, nos. 877, 1077 and 1127.
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coercion depends upon negotiation, since power relations are dependent
upon the latter (Crozier and Friedberg 1977). Forced loans were thus partly
a matter of negotiation; for example, the rate of interest on forced loans
needed to reflect market values to some extent. Scholars have also empha-
sised the high degree of consent that characterised the extraordinary con-
tributions to the previous colonial ancien régime, often in an exchange of
revenues for privileges or rewards that strengthened the social and eco-
nomic position of local elites. The trade consulate of Buenos Aires had
emerged as a result of such bargaining between forced levies and the grant-
ing of privileges (Kraselsky 2011; Grafe and Irigoin 2012; Grieco 2014).
Such were the dynamics of government loans when the military mobil-
isation started in 1806 and culminated in the revolution of 1810. The
forced loans were dependent upon compromise for their implementation.
Composing the list of lenders was undoubtedly a political act; ad hoc com-
mittees including representatives of the Cabildo and the Consulado usually
drew up the list. In theory, the amounts were in proportion to the lenders’
wealth and relied on a register of «capitalists» (large and small traders,
craftsmen and any other head of household reporting economic activity)
made in 1812 for fiscal purposes (Nicolau 1988, Chs. II and III). There
were other procedures, too; for example, the 200,000 peso loan imposed
on Spanish and European citizens in 1816 was regulated by commis-
sioners of the lenders themselves8. Finally, the alcaldes de barrio, a kind
of judge with police powers, communicated the amount required to the
lender and handed over the notice9. The personal networks of the most
powerful merchants obviously gave them access to such management
committees, which facilitated personal gains (Nicolau 1988, p. 45). Yet,
the majority of lenders did not belong to this category, as will be shown
below.
4. DEBT TITLES AND BILLS OF EXCHANGE
The pagarés boosted the emergence of a local financial market and per-
mitted new forms of brokerage and agency, and the number of traded
bonds increased. Bills of exchange already featured prominently in that
market and were used by merchants and officials from the Royal
Treasury alike (Moutoukias 1992; Gelman 1996). In 1808-1809, interim
Viceroy Liniers ordered officeholders to draw bills of exchange upon
major debtors as drawees at a time of increased military spending and rais-
ing public debt10. Later, between 1816 and 1820, these orders of payment
8 RORA, no. 834.
9 Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires [henceforth AGN], Sala X, 7-4-1, 7-4-2, 7-5-1.
10 AGI, no. 617: Cartas y expedientes de Real Hacienda.
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represented—according to figures from Tulio Halperín—14 per cent of the
gross revenues of the Buenos Aires treasury. Bills of exchange also played a
central role in financing local supplies to armies operating in remote dis-
tricts from Buenos Aires (Halperín Donghi 1982, Ch. 2). The liberalisation
of foreign trade resulted in higher revenues from customs, which enabled
the Customs Office to appear as the drawee of bills for which the drawer
was the intendant of the army and the taker or payee was a merchant res-
iding in Buenos Aires or a city close to an army, such as Tucuman or
Mendoza11. According to Moutoukias, those latter merchants made
advances to the army in goods and services, in exchange for which they
received from the army intendant a bill drawn up at the Customs Office
(the drawee), payable on demand in Buenos Aires. They could then
endorse the bill of exchange to a merchant of that city, who thus became
the taker or payee. Much more frequent was the operation in the opposite
direction; at the request of the government, a large trader from Buenos
Aires ordered one of his agents to advance goods or services to the
army, creating in his accounts a credit in favour of the said agent for
their usual operations, but reimbursed with a bill of exchange also payable
on demand in Buenos Aires. The drawer, again, was the intendant of the
army, the drawee the Customs Office, and the payee the merchant who
had given order to his agent. For its part, the drawee—the Customs
Office—only agreed to pay the bill by deducting the unpaid duties of the
holder (or the beneficiary of a new endorsement) (Moutoukias 2018,
pp. 183-185, 191-193). According to Tulio Halperín, local resources
financed 75 per cent of the expenditure of the army of the North in
1810-1811, yet advances by local traders were reimbursed by bills of
exchange paid in Buenos Aires. The latter played an increasingly important
role in the following years (Halperín Donghi 1971a, pp. 96-99). Bragoni
has documented similar developments for the army of «Los Andes»
(Bragoni 2017). Between 1814 and 1819, the use of bills of exchange there-
fore became widespread, in order to transfer funds or pay for the supplies
provided by local merchants (Halperín Donghi 1982, pp. 102-104, 123, 125,
130, 133).
Such transactions involved merchants and agents with various profiles,
many of whom were connected to the networks of the most powerful mer-
chants in the late colonial period. The new forced loans of 1813 enhanced
their position in the political economy of Buenos Aires, because takers
(payees) of bills of exchange could endorse them by paying part of the
forced loan that the government had imposed. As we shall see below,
these represented 16 per cent of all forced loans actually collected between
1813 and 1817, but only a limited group of merchants used them in this
11 AGN, Sala X, legajo 11-1-1: Relación de las libranzas (4 January 1819 and 12 January 1819).
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way. They formed part of the main kinship groups of the local Indiana
(creole) elite and prominent members of the Consulado and the Cabildo
(Tjarks 1962; Socolow 1978; Moutoukias 2015).
5. ASYMMETRIC CIRCULATION OF PAPER BILLS
The new system of forced loans after 1813 can be summarised as the
imposition of a loan to the sovereign authorities provided in coins but
amortised by these authorities by deducting debts in customs duties. As
we saw above, this principle was expanded to other state debts, such as
those incurred in supplying the army; no evidence has been found for
the treasury repaying pagarés directly in money. In certain cases, the treas-
ury of Buenos Aires paid pagarés and bills of exchange grouped by endorse-
ment with an order to the Customs Office to draw bills of exchange upon
its different debtors12. In general, the system of amortising the forced loans
by deducting customs debts seemed to have worked well, as shown in
Table 1. In 1821, the still-unredeemed pagarés accounted for 13 per cent
of the loans raised by the state since 181313. If we take into account only
loans raised between 1813 and 1818, the percentage of unamortised
paper in 1821 drops to 5 per cent.
The proper functioning of this mechanism enhanced an asymmetry in
the financial market; namely, the inequality that existed between agents
whose economic enterprises generated duties to be paid towards customs
duties, and those whose activities did not generate such duties. Moreover,
traders who received bills of exchange in return for equipping and furnish-
ing the army could use these bonds to fulfil their lending obligations. These
bills of exchange represented 16 per cent of all forced loans that were actu-
ally collected between 1813 and 1817, but they were only used by a limited
group. During these years, successive forced loans led to the input of
1,153,500 pesos, 16 per cent of which was paid for by endorsed bills of
exchange. Spanish-American (or creole) traders used these bills to pay
21 per cent of the amount stipulated to lend to the government, whilst
this percentage was 15 per cent for «European» traders14. The names of
the payees on the endorsed bills appear on preserved balance sheets of
forced loans, which enable us to analyse who profited most from these
arrangements. Of the sixty-seven identified creditors, twelve names fre-
quently occur on the lists from between 1814 and 1817; names such as
Achaval, Aguirre (father and son), Anchorena, Arana, Lezica, Riglos,
12 AGN, Sala X, legajo 11-5-1 and 2-9-3.
13 13 per cent according to Moutoukias’ data and 11.5 per cent according to Amaral’s data. See
Table 1.
14 AGN, Sala X, legajos 11-1-1 and 9-4-2.
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Sarratea and others. All were descendants of Spanish migrants, second- or
third-generation migrants born in Buenos Aires, and their fortunes were
based on large-scale trade, the land, political connections and municipal
offices, and participation in militias or other public and honorific func-
tions. For example, Juan Pedro de Aguirre, a landowner and one of the
most important merchants, used bills of exchange to cover more than
half of the considerable sum of 48,750 pesos that he needed to pay in
181615. In other words, in response to the coercive loans that compelled
agents to obtain increasingly scarce metallic currency, some lenders
could use a substitute that was readily available due to the nature of
their activities. Those lenders who were not involved in military enterprises
or Customs found themselves in exactly the opposite position.
This disparity was the obvious result of the diverse social standing of
those to whom the forced-loan levies were addressed. All social classes
had to pay, ranging from artisans with small workshops paying 50 pesos,
to large lenders such as Aguirre, mentioned above, who provided almost
50,000 pesos. In the six lists of forced loans that have survived, showing
total amounts of more than 290,000 pesos—corresponding to the levies
raised in 1813, 1815 and 1818—about 40 per cent of the sums was pro-
vided by about 800 lenders, in amounts ranging from 50 to 150 pesos.
Allowing for the fact that even among those who paid over 150 pesos, a
substantial minority would not profit from the fortuitous advantages of
forced loans either, we arrive at the very rough estimation that around
60 per cent of the lenders would never enjoy the advantages of the other,
large-scale lenders16.
The protests against the forced loans came from this heterogeneous
group with no or few links to the Customs Office. The supplicants request-
ing the reduction or simple cancellation of loans included farmers, arti-
sans, shopkeepers, drivers, land transport contractors, middle-ranking
traders and, occasionally, influential merchants. Most complained about
the complicated nature of the loans and the burden of other contributions;
all of them claimed that they could never use the titles at the Customs
Office; numerous others referred to a shortage of liquidity and a lack of
hard currency; and widows and wives claimed they were too poor to pay17.
In fact, public loanholders who had no dealings with taxes on maritime
and inland trade had two options: either to wait until the end of the war, or
to endorse and sell, which was the only real option for most. The author-
ities themselves raised the issue publicly as early as 1814, highlighting in
particular the problem of very small holders. In 1814 and 1815, they
granted the possibility of using the 50 and 100 pesos pagares to acquire
15 AGN, Sala X, legajo 10-1-1.
16 AGN, Sala X, legajos 2-9-3 and 2-9-7.
17 AGN, Sala X, legajos 11-9-7 and 10-8-6. See also Moutoukias (2015).
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subsistence in customs warehouses18. According to official estimates, this
situation caused a decline in their value, with a depreciation of 40 to 50 per
cent in 1817, which particularly hurt the smallholders who needed to sell
them in the short term19. Some evidence on the price formation in these
transactions reveals the obvious inequality engendered in this highly vola-
tile financial market. A certain trader, Gaspar de Santa Coloma, and his
heir in the commercial house could buy, for example, 252 endorsed prom-
issory notes between 1813 and 1817, amounting to almost 24,000 pesos.
He took them at various discounts, ranging from 25 to 62 per cent below
the issue value, with an average of 36 per cent. The lenders were often lim-
ited to the prices being offered, whilst those who purchased the bonds
multiplied their options. Among the latter, members of the former
Indiana oligarchy who were involved in supplying armies stood out for cre-
ating more and more options for obtaining such bonds at a low price
(Moutoukias 2018)20. As such, the innovative devices did solve a pressing
problem for the local authorities in a flexible way, but they reinforced a
new kind of social asymmetry. At the same time, the loans linked present
spending to future revenues from customs, thereby creating a kind of
«funded» debt, that is, debt guaranteed upon specific future revenues.
6. PUBLIC SPENDING AND THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF
ATLANTIC TRADE
The authorities’ awareness of this link between current expenditure and
future income from customs is also evident from public documents. In
1817, the Secretary of Finance (Secretario de Hacienda) calculated that
the import duties that the government expected to receive would be
more than sufficient to amortise the pagarés of the forced loans in circula-
tion. This enhanced the transparency of the whole fiscal operation and cre-
ated trust in the forced loans, due to the secure funding of the future debt
charges (cf. Amaral 2018, ’t Hart et al. 2018)21.
Customs revenues increased after the region opened up to foreign tra-
ders in 1809, which increased the trade flows to be taxed. Indeed, foreign
trade had been on the rise since the 1790s, despite the disruption caused
by war. Between 1791 and 1796, the port of Buenos Aires received
sixty-five ships each year, on average; in the period between 1815 and
1819, this doubled to an average of 136 vessels. Before 1809, the city’s
Atlantic trade had consisted of a mix of legal shipping and more or less
18 RORA nos. 599, 877 and 1075.
19 RORA, nos. 877, 1077, and 1127.
20 AGN, Sala IX, legajos 7-6-6, 7-6-7 and Sala VII, legajo 7-6-8.
21 RORA, no. 1127.
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tolerated smuggling, the latter mainly with Brazil and Portuguese colonies
in Africa. By 1808, however, British and North American ships were arriv-
ing in remarkable numbers, facilitated by the revolutionary events in the
Atlantic and the transfer of the Portuguese Court to Brazil by the British
Navy. Between 1815 and 1819, most vessels were of British origin (51
per cent), followed by North American (15 per cent), whilst the remainder
consisted of Portuguese and French ships and vessels from the Rio de la
Plata itself (Tjarks and Vidaurreta 1962; Kroeber 1967; Brown 1979;
Silva 1993; Moutoukias 1995; Rosal and Schmit 1999).
The city’s opening up to Atlantic trade in 1809 thus entailed the legal-
isation and taxation of a trade that would otherwise have eluded tax due
to smuggling practices. Scholars have interpreted the measures that led
to this commercial freedom in different ways. According to the nation-
building narrative inherited from the 19th century, the prosperous local
elite imposed free trade out of a desire for emancipation, with claims
embedded in the Enlightenment (Mitre [1857] 1889). Others view the mea-
sures as part of the wider transformation of political culture in the Atlantic
world (Adelman 1999; Cardoso 2009), whereas neo-institutionalist
approaches stress how the authorities chose to build a more efficient insti-
tutional environment that would allow the economic growth of Rio de la
Plata to outstrip that of other regions of Latin America (Coatsworth
1993; Haber 1997; Mahoney 2003). Whatever their differences, all share,
to some degree, a teleological vision.
Yet, this interaction between forced loans and the opening up to foreign
trade is in fact a typical example of unintended order, as mentioned in the
Introduction. Imposed in November 1809 by Cisneros, the last viceroy
before the May Revolution of 1810, the main aim of free trade was to
restore the balance of local finances and to re-establish the silver ship-
ments to Spain, which were important to the authorities resisting the
Napoleonic occupation there. Initially, in fact, the measure was only a lim-
ited instruction to customs officers to allow British ships anchored in the
Rio de la Plata to sell their cargo for a limited period22. Yet this triggered a
path-dependent process, locked in by the forced loans regulations. During
the intensified political conflicts in Buenos Aires, Viceroy Liniers—
Cisneros’ predecessor—and the chief of the Cabildo, Martin de Alzaga,
vehemently exploited smuggling and trade-opening issues as part of their
political game, accusing each other of maladministration. Later, in 1809,
Cisneros helped the Spanish in Europe by responding to the request for
commercial freedom for English merchants as an «Allied Power» against
France (Tjarks 1962).
22 DHA-7, p. 379.
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The debate on the freedom of Atlantic commerce was a major issue in
the political arena, but not the only one; another issue was the role of the
Consulado with its territorial courts, through which it exercised jurisdic-
tion and levied taxes (Kraselsky 2011; Kuethe and Adrien 2014, p. 353).
Some factions preferred an institutional alternative in which the freedom
of trade coexisted with such corporate mechanisms, thus enabling the
Consulados to maintain their crucial role in the political economy and to
capture a larger share of the tax benefits generated by the increase in
Atlantic trade, from which they could finance the continuation of their pre-
vious substantial contributions and donations. Earlier examples of the
financing of river privateers by the Buenos Aires guild and of military expe-
ditions in America by the Consulado of Cadiz show that such an alternative
was plausible (Tjarks 1962, Ch. XI; Malamud Rikles 2007). However, the
role of the Consulado was eroded after the May Revolution of 1810 as
the new and complicated forced loan arrangements stimulated local bur-
eaucracies to engage in more direct relationships with individual bond-
holders, rather than with large corporations.
The dismantling of themost important regulations of colonial trade took
place in 1812 and 1813. In 1812, the opening of the port became permanent
and the government eliminated the mediation of local merchants as a body
by allowing foreigners to trade «in the general interest of the State»23. In the
following year, however, the Constituent Assembly restored the position of
the Consulado and again obliged foreign traders to use the intermediation
of a Consulado member. It was the local government that took the step of
asking the Assembly to reconsider this measure, arguing that restricting
the freedom of foreign traders would reduce import duty revenues and con-
sequently undermine the region’s capacity to finance thewar. The Assembly
accepted these arguments (Nicolau 1988, pp. 50-51). Thereafter, new regu-
lations on the export of local products and preciousmetals were introduced,
as well as new import procedures. The authorities kept returning to the
argument that the war needed to be financed and the forced loans ser-
viced24. This resulted in much greater flexibility and efficiency for local gov-
ernment than had previously been the case, including a higher degree of
transparency in state finances (O’Brien 2012).
7. UNINTENDED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Let us now return to the claims made in the Introduction. The notion of
a «complex system» conceptualises institutional change as a plurality of
23 RORA, no. 363.
24 Recopilación de leyes y decretos de la Aduana desde Mayo de 1810, Buenos Aires, Imprenta
nacional, 1860; AGN, Sala X, 9-4-5.
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economic and political processes that follow their own dynamics while
affecting each other. This approach challenges the Irigoin-Grafe model
of the «Spanish path to the nation state». As we have seen, their arguments
identify institutional change with the political fragmentation caused by the
internalisation of external conflict, the Napoleonic occupation of Spain
and the consequent collapse of the Crown’s arbitrating capacity. Instead,
we emphasised the background to this institutional change that started
before the Napoleonic period, the dismantling of the legal regime of
trade controlled by Spain, the weakening of the two pillars of local political
order under Spanish rule and the emergence of a financial market. These
developments cannot be identified with political fragmentation alone, as
Irigoin and Grafa suggested. The external conflict was obviously a factor
in our argument, but we followed these institutional changes by analysing
where they took place—the internal dynamics of the Buenos Aires political
community—and how these dynamics interacted with other processes in
different parts of this complex system, the viceroyalty of the Rio de la
Plata and the Spanish Empire. This allowed us to track the path-dependent
effects of innovation in public financial management.
The fall in the Potosí situado was mainly caused by local factors but
represented an important external shock for the treasury of Buenos Aires
that affected the political arena. At the other extreme, a minor episode in
the European wars—the attempted occupation of Buenos Aires by
British troops in 1806 and 1807—drove up the cost of the political and
military conflicts, transforming this shock into a fiscal crisis. Initially
intended to help the Spanish authorities who resisted the Napoleonic
occupation and introduced by the last viceroy through political contin-
gency, the opening up to foreign trade in 1809 sparked a rise in customs
revenues before its adoption as part of the republican order. This, in
turn, allowed forced loans to be backed up with coupons that were
accepted as payment for customs duties, thereby postponing the direct
burden of military spending, and later enabling this to be compensated
again through future earnings from customs duties. In turn, the forced
loan mechanism reinforced the growth of legal Atlantic trade.
Introduced by the Constituent Assembly of 1813, the loans were also
imposed on a new, much broader kind of public, which, although it did
not yet consist of an imagined assembly of citizens, was no longer com-
posed of privileged corporations within the political community of the
city (Amaral and Moutoukias 2008, 2012; Amaral 2018).
Forced-lending procedures developed in the context of existing financial
institutions and practices. The resources available within the institutional
culture of the Hispanic world included a range of mechanisms, some of
which resembled forced lending. We have seen that before 1810, particu-
larly after the English invasions, individuals were called upon to provide
loans and donations, which were more or less forced or voluntary. These
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individuals contributed as members of a corporation or institution that
conferred status, such as the Church, militias, a city council or mercantile
corporation, and in the case of loans, there was no explicit remission
clause. It was the Cabildo and Consuladowhich deposited individuals’ con-
tributions into the Buenos Aires treasury, and the total amount was also
relatively small compared with the contributions the corporations made
using their own funds, as we have seen. Yet, after 1813, the government
directly managed public loans and accounted for almost all extraordinary
fiscal inputs. Furthermore, the possibility of using debt bonds or pagarés as
a monetary substitute to pay customs duties might resemble mechanisms
of the former Spanish juros or other financial instruments yielding rents,
but in this case, it functioned precisely as the rent that was paid on a
city’s tax revenues (Dedieu 2018). The innovative pagarés of Buenos Aires
recognised the capital provided with specific repayment clauses, and
agents negotiated their value within the new, emerging secondary market.
The forced lenders obtained from the customs revenue neither the remis-
sion of capital nor the payment of interest; they could use the pagarés to,
once again, reimburse their own debts.
Beyond providing an inventory of continuity and rupture this contribu-
tion has sought to highlight the path-dependent nature of the effects of this
innovation, regardless of the importance of the novelty. It was neither
political fragmentation nor the internalisation of external conflicts that
made these path-dependent effects irreversible, but the link between cur-
rent spending permitted by forced loans and future revenues from trade
tax, as well as paper circulation mechanisms.
The pagarés of Buenos Aires cannot be considered an investment oppor-
tunity, since the government did not issue these bonds for investors who
were free to decide whether to buy them or not, depending on the yield
of the public debt. The actors were forced to lend, although their resistance
could have caused the forced loans to fail. The fact that the mechanisms
worked shows that the loans were based on at least a minimal degree of
political consent. This consent was furthered because the process took
place in parallel to an expansion of the role of large traders in the financing
of armies; traders who could use bills of exchange to pay for forced loans
and simultaneously benefit from the purchase of promissory notes below
their face value, to be used to pay their tax debts. Former creole merchant
elites continued to finance the military and thus engaged in a novel form of
political relationship with the new sovereign power, establishing perman-
ent ties. The extended use of bills of exchange, which were needed for the
provisioning of the military, and the increased interactions in the second-
ary market for the bonds for the forced loans, stimulated the development
of an incipient financial market.
Data from Figures 1 and 2 reveal the options that were available to the
authorities. The contributions from urban corporations had played an
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essential role in keeping the deficits of the city’s early modern finances
within manageable limits. With the erosion of both the situado and finan-
cial aid from the town hall and the merchants’ guild, forced loans became
indispensable. The obvious question is why the actors in question, particu-
larly former members of the Consulado merchants’ guild, accepted the dis-
solution of what had previously been exclusive privileges. Whilst the
political context offers part of the explanation, the scarcity of metallic cur-
rency led to the lengthening of tax payment deadlines and increased the
debts of traders; debts that needed to be repaid in one way or another.
For the new sovereign power, forced loans constituted a flexible response
to temporary shortages of money, whilst former colonial elites regarded
the loan mechanisms as an acceptable way to preserve their position in
the new political economy. The new order was thereby locked into the
opening up of Atlantic free trade, which had the unintended consequence
of weakening the old corporate order, in a complex form of institutional
change.
APPENDIX: SOURCES FOR FIGURES 1 AND 2
Figures 1 and 2 aim to highlight the role played by the circulation of
bonds (pagarés and bills of exchange) during the institutional changes of
1813-1820. The problem of the debt itself is a related topic, but one that
is subordinate to these objectives. The graphs put the loans granted by
individuals to the sovereign power of Buenos Aires from 1813 onwards
in historical context. Furthermore, they show how financial support for
the sovereign power changed from being a configuration of ancien
régime actors and institutions to a republican order, a transition that was
stimulated by the circulation of these bonds. The graphs reveal the finan-
cial constraints faced by various local governments and the nature of the
resources they tried to mobilise.
Income and Expenditure of the Royal Treasury of Buenos Aires,
1789-1821
Four authors have published statistics on the finances of the Rio de la
Plata: Klein (1973), Amaral (1988, 1995, 2011), Halperín Donghi (1982)
and TePaske and Klein (1982). Halperín Donghi presents the totals of rev-
enue and expenditure in terms of 5-year periods, whereas TePaske and
Klein stop in 1806/1808. Only Amaral’s data enable us to reconstruct an
annual series from 1790 to 1821. In addition, the author identified inter-
account transfers to finance temporary deficits that are of major signifi-
cance to the interpretation of the series.
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The inter-account transfer mechanisms that Amaral discovered gave
rise to a debate that ultimately confirmed the validity of his data. His ana-
lysis is based on contemporary texts describing the system and sources
showing the actual practices of financial officials. The various types of
income and expenditure were organised into three categories of accounts
(Ramos): (a) the accounts of the royal budget (Ramos de Real Hacienda
en común), which comprised the taxes and levies needed for all current
and extraordinary administrative and military expenditure; (b) the
accounts of the royal finances (Ramos particulares de Real Hacienda), con-
taining the taxes and levies that belonged to the king and were destined for
specific expenses, with funds that could not be disposed of freely, at least
not in theory and (c) the specific accounts of other organisations and pri-
vate persons (Ramos particulares ajenos), whose funds did not belong to
the royal finances at all, such as the Montepíos, which was intended to sup-
port soldiers, retired members of the administration or their widows or
funds that were destined to be transferred or returned to their rightful own-
ers, such as the individual deposits in the bienes de difuntos, the property of
estates with heirs in Spain.
The first category, Ramos (a), the accounts that maintained administra-
tive and military structures, was by far the most important. Deficits in
these accounts were financed by making temporary transfers (suplementos)
from Ramos (b) and (c) to Ramos (a). Prior to the revolutionary wars,
most deficits were a consequence of inevitable fluctuations in the arrival of
the situado, the funds fromUpper Peru. If such transfers proved insufficient,
the authorities mobilised the necessary funds through loans and donations
from the heads of notable families or institutions such as the Cabildo (city
council) and the trade Consulado. Prior to their use by the administration
of Ramos (a), these contributions were first recorded in Ramos (b) or
Ramos (c), to be recorded later by the finance officers as internal transfers
(suplementos) under the revenues for Ramos (a) under the heading of
Otras instituciones, which also entailed tithes or the revenues of the tobacco
monopoly (Amaral 1984, 2011, pp. 387-391, in particular Tables 1 and 4).
Amaral also describes the transfers in an accounting system based on a
straightforward distinction between revenues/entrances (cargo) and
expenses/withdrawals (data). Whilst it is impossible to reproduce the
author’s detailed account here, the recording of transfers (suplementos)
of whatever nature and the corresponding restitutions (reintegros) had
the effect of artificially inflating both the cargo and the data, but in differ-
ent proportions (Amaral 2011, pp. 392-412). Amaral’s first interpretation of
the data gave rise to a debate in 1984. All of the participants in this debate
recognised the existence of these transfer mechanisms, but interpreted
them in different ways (Amaral 1984; Cuenca Esteban 1984a; Fisher
1984; Halperín Donghi 1984; Klein 1984; TePaske 1984; see also Klein
and Barbier 1988, pp. 43-44). Whilst the details of this debate are not of
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direct relevance to this paper, in the end, a degree of consensus arose
around Amaral’s interpretation and the quality of his research (Sánchez
Santiró 2013, pp. 14-28).
We thus have data for the period 1789-1821 that reflect the categories
and procedures of the relevant financial officials, resulting in a homoge-
neous series for the whole period, despite the different contexts in which
the figures were published (Amaral 1988, 1995, 2011). According to the
publications by Amaral used in Figures 1 and 2, suplementos to the treas-
ury of Ramos (a) only proved necessary in 8 years between 1790 and 1821;
they represented between 8 and 55 per cent of the additional funds. To esti-
mate the level of indebtedness, one should discard the suplementos and
their reintegros. This is not the purpose of our graphs here; however, we
are interested in the changing institutional context of the transfers. We
have identified and removed short-term transfers and compensations to
offset the fluctuations in the arrival of the situado, but we have kept trans-
fers to and from «other institutions». The latter were more or less in bal-
ance over a number of years—such as during the transfers of 1797,
caused by the war with Britain—yet they no longer truly compensated
for one another anymore after 1806. In maintaining the suplementos and
their reintegros, it is possible to include the fact that custom revenues
were used directly to pay 40 to 50 per cent of the debts after 1813, in par-
ticular for the amortisation of the forced loans, as is explained in the text.
Contributions from Urban Institutions, Forced Loans and Deficits,
1806-1821
Figure 2 mainly depicts the contributions from urban institutions that
formed part of the ancien régime configuration of public finances. These
were an aggregate of levies consisting of: (a) contributions from the Cabildo
and the Consulado based upon their own funds, fed by their own taxes; (b)
donations from individuals made through these institutions; (c) the Royal
Monopoly of Tobacco and a tax administered by the Cabildo with a fixed
aim (municipal de guerra) and (d) church levies (claveria de diezmo). Of
these four categories, the contributions made by the Cabildo and the
Consulado constituted 79 per cent of the total between 1806 and 1812. The
data are from the «Other Institutions» series published by Amaral, which
includes Grieco’s individual grants and loans (Grieco 2014, Chs. 6 and 7).
The amounts of the forced loans in Figure 2 are estimated from the bal-
ance sheets of 1816 and 1819-1821, which provide details regarding claims
made upon the public, the funds actually received by the authorities and
the bonds in circulation25. Our own figures from the archives suggest
25 AGN, Sala X, legajos 2-9-7, 9-4-2, 9-4-3, 11-1-1, 11-5-1 and 22-2-7.
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that a total of 2,608,280 pesos in loans was actually received by the sover-
eign power between 1813 and 1821. Amaral’s data (Amaral 1988, 1995)
suggest a total of 2,924,100 pesos for the same types of loans. Despite
the difference of around 300,000 pesos, the two sources complement
each other, since his series are derived from the accounts of the Caja de
Buenos Aires, which recorded public borrowing in cities in the interior
that had been transferred to the capital, whereas the figures extracted
from the aforementioned balance sheets refer only to the city of Buenos
Aires. We retained the Amaral series for consistency.
The Income and Expenditure Balance Series therefore includes all con-
tributions and reimbursements (suplementos and reintegros) in addition to
taxes and current expenditures.
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